TULANE
LAW REVIEW
VOL. 82

MAY 2008

NO. 5

The New European Choice-of-Law
Revolution
Ralf Michaels

*

Conflict of laws in Europe was long viewed by outsiders as formalist, antiquated, and
uninteresting. Now that the European Union has become more active in the field, things are
changing, but most view these changes as a mere gradual evolution. This is untrue. Actually,
and fascinatingly, we are observing a real European conflicts revolution—in importance,
radicalness, and irreversibility comparable to the twentieth-century American conflicts revolution.
European developments go beyond the federalization of choice-of-law rules in EU
regulations. In addition, EU choice of law is being constitutionalized, in particular through the
principles of mutual recognition and the country-of-origin principle, along with the influence
from nondiscrimination, EU citizenship, and EU fundamental rights. Together, these
developments create a methodological pluralization that leads to a bifurcation of intraCommunity and external conflicts and to a conflict between two methods, one developed on the
basis of classical choice of law, the other based on specific EU-law reasoning.
These developments constitute a genuine choice-of-law revolution. Classical European
choice of law was characterized by three principles: privatization, nationalization, and domestic
internationalism. These are replaced by three new principles: regulation, Europeanization, and
mediatization. This revolution is different from that in the United States, but it nonetheless holds
important lessons.
In the course of the argument, this Article introduces the other contributions to this issue.
These articles were first delivered at a Symposium, jointly organized by the Duke Law Center
for International and Comparative Law and the Tulane Law Review, and titled “The New
European Choice-of-Law Revolution—Lessons for the United States?”
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INTRODUCTION

“The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution—Lessons for
the United States?” The title of this Symposium, convened in
collaboration between the Tulane Law Review and the Duke Law
Center for International and Comparative Law on February 9, 2008,
presents a provocation for Europeans and Americans alike: Europeans
do not believe in conflicts revolutions and Americans rarely believe
they can learn from Europe. But the provocation also serves as the
thesis of this Article. What we are observing in Europe is nothing less
than a revolution. Americans will be probably unwilling and certainly
unable to copy it entirely into their system. But the European
developments provide ample material for inspiration.
Few consider the growing influence of EU law on choice of law
to be a revolution.1 For many, Community law appears to be of only
1.
Cf., e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Revolution and the European
Evolution in Choice of Law: Reciprocal Lessons, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1741, 1743 (“[T]he use of
the term revolution is less appropriate for describing the European developments [in choice
of law] than the American movement . . . .”). But see Fausto Pocar, La comunitarizzazione
del diritto internazionale privato: una “European Conflict of Laws Revolution”?, 36 RIVISTA
DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE [RIV. DIR. INT. PRIV. PROC.] 873, 883-84
(2000) (Italy); Johan Meeusen, Instrumentalisation of Private International Law in the
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tangential importance. Yet a comparative analysis suggests that Europe
is undergoing a real conflicts revolution—in importance, radicalness
and irreversibility comparable to the twentieth-century American
conflicts revolution. Federalization, constitutionalization, and pluralization
of European choice of law succeed where reform proposals in the
1970s failed: They bring about a genuine paradigm change.
The designation as revolution does not imply an evaluation. A
revolution may be good or bad—or, as is usually the case, good for
some and bad for others. It may be progressive or regressive—
counterrevolutions are revolutions, too. It may begin brutally, with the
storming of the Bastille, or it may be realized only gradually, like the
Russian October Revolution, which initially did not stop trams from
running and people from visiting the opera. It may reverse results or
only reasoning. In any event, a revolution results in the irreversible
loss of the old. That this is likely for European choice of law will be
shown here. Comparison with the United States makes it clear not
only that we are observing a real revolution in Europe, but also how
much this European revolution differs from the American one.
The Article is structured as follows. Part II develops the concept
of a conflicts revolution on the archetype of the U.S. conflicts
revolution of the twentieth century and relates this to European
developments in the nineteenth century. Those developments
constituted a movement that defined three foundational principles of
classical contemporary European choice of law: privatization,
nationalization, and domestic internationalism. Part III analyzes in
more depth three revolutionary developments of European choice of
law. The first development is federalization of choice of law, by way
of European codification. The second development is constitutionalization, in particular through the principles of mutual recognition and
the country-of-origin principle, and through the influence from
nondiscrimination, EU citizenship, and EU fundamental rights. The
third development is methodological pluralization, which leads to a
bifurcation of intra-Community and external conflicts and to a conflict
between two methods, one developed on the basis of classical choice
of law, the other based on specific EU law reasoning. Part IV demonstrates, first, why these developments constitute a genuine choice-oflaw revolution. The classical principles of privatization, nationalization, and domestic internationalism are replaced by three new
European Union: Towards a European Conflicts Revolution?, 9 EUR. J. MIGRATION & LAW
287, 290-91 (2007); Symeon C. Symeonides, Rome II and Tort Conflicts: A Missed
Opportunity, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 173, 174 (2008).
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principles: regulation, Europeanization, and mediatization. Part IV.B
suggests that this revolution, although different from that in the United
States, nonetheless holds important lessons. The individual articles in
this Symposium issue are introduced in the course of this argument.
II.

REVOLUTIONS IN CHOICE OF LAW

A. The American Conflicts Revolution as Archetype
The model for each conflicts revolution2 is the U.S. conflicts
revolution. Its story is well known, at least in its main features—its
early forerunners in the 1930s with academic critique against the
formalism of the First Restatement, its escalation to a highpoint in the
1960s with important court decisions and sometimes radical academic
reconceptualizations of the field, its subsequent decline when some of
its achievements were adopted and others replaced, and the current
widespread disillusionment. This sequence of events—reform,
radicalization, restoration—is not atypical for revolutions. Nor is the
fact that resulting practical outcomes have not changed much.3 What
the revolution has changed is not so much the outcomes of cases but
the way in which we in the United States think about choice of law.
Revolutions are, first and foremost, paradigm changes, reactions
against old paradigms.4 The Copernican Revolution succeeded over
the Ptolemaian world view not because the latter created inaccurate
results but because it required an ever more complicated system of
epicycles. Similarly, the old U.S. choice-of-law paradigm yielded
workable results, but the path to these results was too complicated and
left too little space for those considerations considered actually
relevant. The role of epicycles was played by the so-called “escape
devices”—characterization, the substance/procedure distinction,
renvoi, and the public policy exceptions.
Formalism and “escape devices” existed in Europe, too.
Nonetheless, the Europeans remained largely critical, both toward

2.
On the Canadian “conflicts revolution” (which differs significantly from the
American one), see generally Peter Kincaid, Jensen v. Tolofson and the Revolution in Tort
Choice of Law, 74 CAN. BAR REV. 537 (1995); William A. Tetley, The On-Going Saga of
Canada’s Conflict of Law Revolution—Theory and Practice (pt. 1), 24 PRAXIS DES
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [IPRAX] 457 (2004) (F.R.G.).
3.
For a vivid characterization, see Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A
Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 44 (1984) (“The mountains labored
mightily only to give birth to a mouse.”).
4.
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 92 (2d ed. 1970).
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American revolutions5 and toward the European reform proposals they
inspired.6 Adaptation and evolution were preferred over real
revolution.7 The reasons are manifold. Because European nations are
older and more homogenous than U.S. states, they may have a greater
desire for stability and their courts may be less prone to legal change
than their U.S. counterparts.8 In the United States, choice of law
largely concerns interstate conflicts between legal systems whose
common laws are structurally quite similar but often differ
significantly in their policies; choice of law in Europe deals with legal
orders that differ more in doctrine and system than in their policies.9
Yet the most important reason is the very nature of revolutions.
Revolutions are defined less by what they aim for and more by what
they tear down, less by what they are for and more by what they are
against. Revolutions are always reactions against the status quo.
When Brainerd Currie wrote that “[a]lmost all constructive writing on
conflict of laws in this century has been in revolt against this
‘heritage,’”10 by “constructive writing” he meant writing in the United
States, and by “heritage” he meant the formalism of the American
vested rights theory as established by Joseph Beale and as codified in
the Restatement of Conflict of Laws in 1934.

5.
See, e.g., Gerhard Kegel, Paternal Home and Dream Home: Traditional Conflict
of Laws and the American Reformers, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 615, 633 (1979).
6.
For an overview, see generally Erik Jayme, The American Conflicts Revolution
and the Impact on European Private International Law, in FORTY YEARS ON: THE EVOLUTION
OF POSTWAR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE 15, 15-27 (1990); Frank Vischer, New
Developments in European Conflict of Laws and the Influence of the U.S. Doctrine—A Short
Survey, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON
MEHREN 459 (James A.R. Nafziger &
AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD].

Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002) [hereinafter LAW

See generally Kurt Siehr, Revolution and Evolution in Conflicts Law, 60 LA. L.
7.
REV. 1353 (2000) (discussing the pragmatic development of European conflicts law). For the
common law developments, see generally Peter M. North, Reform But Not Revolution:
General Course on Private International Law, in 220 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,
RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
9 (1990).
8.
MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE: A GUIDE THROUGH
THE JUNGLE 12-13 (1995); Vischer, supra note 6, at 460.
9.
Ralf Michaels, American Law (United States), in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 66, 70 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006); see Mathias Reimann, Domestic and
International Conflicts Law in the United States and Western Europe, in INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT OF LAWS FOR THE THIRD MILLENNIUM—ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FRIEDRICH K.
JUENGER 109, 113 (Patrick Borchers & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2001) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS].
10. BRAINERD CURRIE, The Verdict of Quiescent Years, in BRAINERD CURRIE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 584, 613 (1963).
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This was not Europe’s heritage. Of course, there are superficial
similarities between the First Restatement and classical European
choice of law. Both prefer rules over principles. Both are jurisdictionselecting instead of rule-selecting. Both determine the applicable law
on the basis of a connecting factor, without regard to the substance of
or the policies behind the law so determined. Both favor predictability
and uniformity of outcomes over substantive justice in the individual
case. Finally, as already mentioned, European choice of law makes
ample use of the same escape devices as the traditional method in the
United States.11
But the similarity is superficial.12 Traditional European choice of
law is paradigmatically different from the First Restatement. The
vested-rights theory, the main target for the American Revolution,
never took strong hold in Europe: Wächter and Savigny had refuted it
in Germany in the 1840s before it could become prominent; a later
approach by Antoine Pillet remained largely irrelevant.13 When the
American conflicts revolution set in, European choice of law had its
revolution already behind it.

B.

The European Conflicts Revolution of the Nineteenth Century

This European conflicts revolution occurred in the nineteenth, not
in the twentieth century. What Paul Neuhaus called a “Copernican
turn” of choice of law was a genuine Copernican revolution, a
paradigm shift in the way here described, which leaves the objects
unaltered but defines our perspective on these objectives in a
fundamentally new way.14 The wealth of opinions in nineteenth11. Cf. Jacob Dolinger, In Defense of the “General Part” Principles, in
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 9, at 23, 24 (commenting that in Europe,
“escape clauses . . . carefully manipulate the method of choice of law”); Kurt Siehr, General
Problems of Private International Law in Modern Codifications—De Lege Lata and De Lege
Europea Ferenda, 2005 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 17, 26-29 (summarizing the recent development
of escape clauses in Europe).
12. Bernard Audit, A Continental Lawyer Looks at American Choice-of-Law
Principles, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 589, 590-98 (1979).
13. See Ralf Michaels, EU Law as Private International Law? Reconceptualising the
Country-of-Origin Principle as Vested-Rights Theory, 2 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 195, 216-20, 22627 (2006).
14. Paul Neuhaus, Savigny und die Rechtsfindung aus der Natur der Sache, 15
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ]
364, 366 (1949-1950) (F.R.G.). For a discussion in English, see Kahn-Freund, General
Problems of Private International Law, in 143 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL
DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 139, 244
(1974). Savignyan choice of law is discussed as paradigm in the sense used by KUHN, supra
note 4, by Julio D. Gonzáles Campos, Diversification, spécialisation, flexibilisation et
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century Europe is no smaller than that of twentieth-century America.
Carl Georg Wächter developed a local law theory that predated and
possibly influenced those of Cook and Ehrenzweig.15 Heinrich Thöl
discussed whether principles should be preferred over rules and
developed, long before Currie, a kind of governmental interest
analysis, under which the scope of statutes was determined by their
interpretation, and forum law would yield to foreign law only if the
forum had no interest.16 This idea was confronted with the criticism,
well known from the American debate,17 that the lawmaker usually
does not think about the territorial scope of his rules.18
The most important developments in the nineteenth century,
however, that led to the foundation of the traditional European conflict
of laws, differed from those in twentieth-century United States. They
can be described under three key concepts—privatization, nationalization, and domestic internationalism.
The first element—privatization—can be found in the work of
Savigny.19 By shifting the focus of choice of law away from the statute
and its focus on the legal relation and its seat, he changed not so much
the results, but the perspective. In particular, he so achieved a
privatized understanding of choice of law that was different from both
older European approaches and from those by Joseph Story, whom he
otherwise often followed.20 Story had viewed private international law
as an international law for private matters; Savigny established it as a
matérialisation des règles de droit international privé (Cours général), in 287 ACADÉMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 30-34 (2000). The idea of a paradigm is often invoked by critics. See,
e.g., H.U. JESSURUN D’OLIVEIRA, DE RUÏNE VAN EEN PARADIGMA: DE KONFLIKTREGEL (1976);
Rudolf Wiethölter, Begriffs- oder Interessenjurisprudenz—falsche Fronten im IPR und
Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht, in INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT UND RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG
IM AUSGANG DES 20 JAHRHUNDERTS: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GERHARD KEGEL 213, 222-24, 256-60
(Alexander Lüderitz & Jochen Schröder eds., 1977).
15. For the influence on Ehrenzweig, see K. Lipstein, The General Principles of
Private International Law, in 135 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS:
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 144-47 (1972)
(“Ehrenzweig—Wächter redivivus”).
16. HEINRICH THÖL, EINLEITUNG IN DAS DEUTSCHE PRIVATRECHT 170-71, 175-76
(Göttingen, 1851).
17. E.g., Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78
MICH. L. REV. 392, 392-93 (1980).
18. CARL FRIEDRICH VON GERBER, SYSTEM DES DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 728 n.5
(6th ed. 1858).
19. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Wm.
Guthrie transl., 1868).
20. See Gerhard Kegel, Story and Savigny, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 39 (1989); Ralf
Michaels, Public and Private International Law: German Views on Global Issues, 4 J.
PRIVATE INT’L L. 121, 126-28 (2008).
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private law for international connections.21 Story’s conflict of laws was
a system of competences, resembling jurisdiction and the recognition
of foreign judgments. Savigny’s was a system of references, separating
the applicable law from jurisdiction and the application of foreign law
from the recognition of foreign judgments. Comity was no longer, as
it had been for Story, a concept of public international law and
international relations; it became a concept of a global civil
community.22 Territoriality was no longer an expression of territorial
sovereignty but a means to determine the closest connection, the “seat”
of a legal relation. The legal relation predated its regulation by the
state—other than jurisdiction for Story, and also other than Beale’s
vested right, which was conferred by a state. Private law was detached
from specific regulatory interests by states (though not from the state
at large)23 so “public” common interests, which of course were
important in nineteenth-century private law too,24 could be taken into
account in a specific private-law manner. This made it possible to
formulate abstract and universal rules of reference that determined the
applicability of foreign law without giving it extraterritorial validity.
The second element—nationalization—is linked with the name
of Mancini.25 Mancini adopted many of Savigny’s postulates, but not
his depoliticized vision of private international law. For Mancini (like
for the authors of the French Civil Code before him)26 the most
important connecting factor in choice of law was membership in a
political community (the nation) as realized in a principle of
nationality. Territoriality was restricted to those areas of the law that
implicate public policy. This foundation of choice of law in
Michaels, supra note 20, at 127.
See id.
See Ralf Michaels, Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private
International Law and the Challenge from Europeanization and Globalization, in AKTUELLE
21.
22.
23.

FRAGEN ZU POLITISCHER UND RECHTLICHER STEUERUNG IM KONTEXT DER GLOBALISIERUNG
119, 128-30 (Michael Stolleis & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 2007).
24. Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, Private Law and the State—Comparative
Perceptions and Historical Observations, 71 RABELSZ 345, 351, 380 (2007); cf. Hans-Peter
Haferkamp, The Science of Private Law and the State in 19th Century Germany, 56 AM. J.
COMP. L. (forthcoming 2008).
25. See CHRISTIAN VON BAR & PETER MANKOWSKI, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT
517-21 (2d ed. 2003). On nationalization as the defining characteristic of nineteenth- and
twentieth-century choice of law, see JEAN-LOUIS HALPÉRIN, ENTRE NATIONALISME JURIDIQUE
ET COMMUNAUTÉ DE DROIT 67-85 (1999); JAN KROPHOLLER, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT
14-15 (6th ed. 2006); ERIK JAYME, PASQUALE STANISLAO MANCINI—INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT ZWISCHEN RISORGIMENTO UND PRAKTISCHER JURISPRUDENZ (1980); Kurt H.
Nadelmann, Mancini’s Nationality Rule and Non-Unified Legal Systems: Nationality Versus
Domicile, 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 418 (1969).
26. HALPÉRIN, supra note 25, at 24-26.
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community membership and the preference of community affiliation
over territoriality may appear, at first sight, similar to interest analysis
as established by Currie, which also widely prioritizes community
affiliation (as expressed in domicile) over territoriality. But an
important difference exists: Whereas Currie focuses on domicile in
order to determine the regulatory interests of governments, Mancini
prioritizes nationality over domicile because it expresses the
individual’s membership in the community (the nation) itself.
Finally, the third element of the nineteenth-century European
conflicts paradigm is domestic internationalism. Broadly, for Savigny,
choice-of-law rules were based on reason; for Mancini, they were
based on (public) international law. In either case, they were distinct
from domestic law and thus not in need of legislative regulation
(though both acknowledged existing state rules). The counter-idea,
that choice of law is not universal but based in each state’s law, shapes
the American understanding, where choice of law stands in close
proximity to the state’s substantive law and the underlying interests.
For a long time, this dichotomy of universalism and particularism
shaped debates in choice of law. The prevailing view in Europe today
combines both approaches: rules of choice of law are rules of
domestic law and thus open to legislative discretion, but they are
strictly different from domestic substantive law rules,27 and their focus
is international. Accordingly, the considerations going into choice-oflaw rules are not firmly connected with those of substantive law nor
those of public international law, a position sometimes described as the
“third school of private international law” (besides the internationalist
and nationalist approaches).28 The most important connecting factors
are nationality and territoriality; yet because choice of law does not
merely enforce sovereignty interests, it is not confined to this
dichotomy and instead uses further connecting factors. In U.S. law, an
occasional consequence from this distinction between substantive law
and conflict of laws is the characterization of choice-of-law rules as
procedural rules and the procedural resolution of conflict-of-laws

27. GERHARD KEGEL & KLAUS SCHURIG, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 52-58 (9th
ed. 2004); KLAUS SCHURIG, KOLLISIONSNORM UND SACHRECHT: ZU STRUKTUR, STANDORT
UND METHODE DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT (1981).
28. Konrad Zweigert, Die dritte Schule im internationalen Privatrecht. Zur neueren
Wissenschaftsgeschichte des Kollisionsrechts, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR LEO RAAPE 35, 43, 49
(1948); cf. Kurt Lipstein, Private International Law with a Social Content—A Super Law?, in
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KONRAD ZWEIGERT ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG 179, 179 (Herbert Bernstein et al.
eds., 1981) (noting Zweigert’s use of the phrase).
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problems by reference to the law of pleading.29 In continental
European law, by contrast, choice-of-law rules are quite clearly neither
substantive nor procedural law but represent a third category of rules.30
Conflict of laws is domestic in its foundation, international in its focus.
The regulation of conflicts problems is decentralized in the sense that
every state has its own rules. But uniformity is a goal, and the way
toward it leads first to bilateral choice-of-law rules and finally to
unification by treaty.
These three principles—privatization, nationalization, domestic
nationalism—provided the pillars of European choice of law until
today. The European paradigm proved more flexible than the First
Restatement in the United States and was therefore capable of
integrating many of the American innovations in a broadened system
of conflicts interests.31 Substantive interests could be accounted for
through special types of choice-of-law rules protecting weaker parties
or recognizing specific regulatory interests, which the American
theory of vested rights did not allow. Institutions of the “general part,”
which figured in the United States as “escape devices” inconsistent
with the logic of the vested-rights theory, constituted the cornerstone
of European choice of law. Application of the law of the common
domicile to car accidents, which became crucial for the American
conflicts revolution with the decision in Babcock v. Jackson,32 could be
reached effortlessly through special choice-of-law rules without the
need of a revolution.33
III. EUROPEANIZATION
Europeanization, thus the thesis of this Article, is not so easy to
integrate into classical choice of law as the American reforms of the
twentieth century because the political background is shifting. Such
political changes have triggered each paradigmatic shift in European
conflicts thinking up until today. In the thirteenth century, the rise of
city states led to conflicts between local statutes as islands within the
sea of the ius commune; the reaction was the development of a conflict
of laws based on this very ius commune. In the seventeenth century,
29. Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 324-29
(1990); Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 2448, 2472 (1999).
30. KROPHOLLER, supra note 25, 103-04.
31. KEGEL & SCHURIG, supra note 27, at 128-58; KROPHOLLER, supra note 25, at 3136. For comparison with governmental interest analysis, see Kegel, supra note 5, at 621-25.
32. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
33. For a comparative overview, see Siehr, supra note 7, at 1354-59.

2008]

THE NEW REVOLUTION

1617

the ius commune was declining and the sovereign state was rising, so
conflicts now existed between states; the comity doctrine reacted by
founding choice of law in international relations. The nineteenth
century saw the rise of the private bourgeois society in partial
opposition to the state and the nation as fundament of the nation state;
the reactions were privatization and nationalization of choice of law.
The strengthened social-interventionist state in the twentieth century,
which spurred the conflicts revolution in the United States, could be
integrated in Europe without a revolution, because conflict of laws was
already understood as domestic.
Now that this system of independent nation states is merging into
the European Union, conflict of laws is changing as well. Although
choice of law has long been a matter of some concern for the
European Union34 its influence was, for a long time, minimal. Only
now that choice of law is widely Europeanized and thereby renewed
has a real conflicts revolution been created. One might expect this new
European conflict of laws to approximate the U.S. conflicts revolution
because the European Union as a quasi-federal organization has quite
similar conflicts to resolve as the federal system of the United States.35
To some extent this is the case, as the comparison shows. But because
the European paradigm against which the European revolution is
directed differs from the theory of vested rights, as demonstrated
earlier, the revolution looks different as well. Three relevant aspects
are visible in Europe that are largely absent in the United States:
federalization, constitutionalization, and pluralization. They overcome
the three central elements of classical European choice of law:
privatization, nationalization, and domestic internationalism.

A. Federalization
That the national character of choice of law is being overcome is
most obvious in federal regulation, which withdraws control of
conflicts of laws from states and instead centralizes it. Such federal
legislative regulation has often been suggested in the United States,
especially by reformers and revolutionaries eager to constrict and

34. See Ulrich Drobnig, Conflict of Laws and the European Community, 15 AM. J.
COMP. L. 204 (1967); René Savatier, Le marché commun au regard du droit international
privé, REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [REV. CRIT. DR. INT. PRIV.] 237 (1959)
(Fr.).
35. See Reimann, supra note 9, at 119-21.
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coordinate the interests of states, which had now become relevant.36
Even Brainerd Currie deemed federal legislation desirable, at least for
important issues.37 More recently, similar proposals have been made.38
The practicability of such federal codification has always been
doubted. David Cavers warned as such in 1965, at the time adequately,
with a comparison to the European Communities.39
Proposals for a Europe-wide unification of choice of law have
existed since the 1960s; for contracts, they culminated in the Rome
Convention of 1980.40 Although the Convention was part of the acquis
communautaire, it was a treaty, not a Community instrument, so the
European Court of Justice did not have a general competence for
choice of law.41 Two special protocols to the Convention intended to
establish such a competence did not enter into force until 2004. As a
consequence, the truly uniform interpretation of choice-of-law rules
envisaged in article 18 of the Rome Convention remained, largely, an
illusion. Real EU choice-of-law rules were limited to provisions in
directives determining their scope of application.42 Only when the
36. Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421, 433-34 (1919); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 402 (1964); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 513 (1954); Alfred Hill,
The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 542-43 (1958); Ernest G.
Lorenzen Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736, 751 (1924).
37. CURRIE, supra note 10, at 183. For one such issue, see Paul S. Bird, Note, Mass
Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to the Choice of Law Impasse, 96 YALE L.J. 1077, 109293 (1987).
38. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal
Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 1-51 (1991); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein,
From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1224-25 (2000).
39. DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 247 (1965); David F. Cavers,
Legislative Choice of Law: Some European Examples, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 340, 359 (1971).
40. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 O.J. (L 266).
The consolidated version appears at 1998 O.J. (C 27) 34. On the legislative history, see Peter
M. North, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980):
Its History and Main Features, in PETER M. NORTH, ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
23, 29-34 (1993).
41. Teun Struycken, Private Law Contracts to Which the European Community Is a
Party, in INTERCONTINENTAL COOPERATION THROUGH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS
IN MEMORY OF PETER E. NYGH 385, 393-94 (Talia Einhorn & Kurt Siehr eds., 2004); A.V.M.
Struycken, Les conséquences de l’intégration européenne sur le développement du droit
international privé, in 232 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS:
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 257, 295, 323-24
(1992).
42. PETER STONE, EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW—HARMONISATION OF LAWS 31617 (2006); Harry Duintjer Tebbens, Les règles de conflit contenues dans les instruments de
droit dérivé, in LES CONFLITS DE LOIS ET LE SYSTÈME JURIDIQUE COMMUNAUTAIRE 101-15
(Angelika Fuchs, Horatia Muir Watt & Étienne Pataud eds., 2004); Lajos Vékás, Der Weg zur
Vergemeinschaftung des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts—eine Skizze, in LIBER
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Treaty of Amsterdam granted the European Union the competence to
regulate conflict of laws43 was it possible to codify choice-of-law rules
for noncontractual obligations in the Rome II Regulation;44 a
codification of rules for contractual obligations has just been adopted
as the Rome I Regulation.45 A proposed Rome III Regulation would
codify rules for matrimonial property regimes.46 Other proposals, or
Green Papers, concern matrimonial matters,47 maintenance obligations,48
and successions and wills.49
MEMORIALIS PETAR ŠARČEVIĆ: UNIVERSALISM, TRADITION AND THE INDIVIDUAL 171, 174-83
(Vesna Tomljenović, Johan Erauw & Paul Volken eds., 2006) [hereinafter LIBER MEMORIALIS
ŠARČEVIĆ].
43. See PHILIPPE-EMMANUEL PARTSCH, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ EUROPÉEN:
DE ROME À NICE (2003); Jürgen Basedow, The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws
Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, 37 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 687, 691-92 (2000); Katharina
Boele-Woelki & Ronald H. van Ooik, The Communitarization of Private International Law,
2002 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 1, 3; Alegría Borrás, Le droit international privé communautaire:
réalités, problèmes et perspectives d’avenir, in 317 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,
RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
313, 421 (2005); Oliver Remien, European Private International Law, the European
Community and Its Emerging Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 38 COMMON MARKET
L. REV. 53, 57 (2001). For criticism from England, see Andrew Dickinson, European Private
International Law: Embracing New Horizons or Mourning the Past?, 1 J. PRIVATE INT’L L.
197, 200-01 (2005); Richard Fentiman, Choice of Law in Europe, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2021,
2024-27 (2008). The United Kingdom and Denmark are not automatically bound by EU
legislation in choice of law but maintain discretion to opt in. The United Kingdom opted into
the Rome II Regulation. Regulation 864/2007, On the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual
Obligations (Rome II), recital 39, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 43 [hereinafter Rome II].
Consultations regarding opting into the Rome I Regulation are ongoing. See MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE, ROME I—SHOULD THE U.K. OPT IN? (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/
publications/cp0508.htm. Denmark did not opt into the Rome II Regulation. Rome II, supra,
recital 40.
44. Rome II, supra note 43.
45. Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations (Rome I) (adopted June 6, 2008) [hereinafter Rome I].
46. Commission Green Paper on Conflict of Laws in Matters Concerning Matrimonial
Property Regimes, Including the Question of Jurisdiction and Mutual Recognition, COM
(2006) 400 final (July 17, 2006). The replies are compiled at European Comm’n,

Contributions on the Green Paper on Conflict of Laws in Matters Concerning Matrimonial
Property Regime, Including the Question of Jurisdiction and Mutual Recognition, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/matrimonial_property/news_contrib
utions_matrimonial_property_en.htm (last visited June 3, 2008).
47. Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 as

Regards Jurisdiction and Introducing Rules Concerning Applicable Law in Matrimonial
Matters, COM (2006) 339 final (July 17, 2006).
48. Proposal for a Council Regulation on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition
and Enforcement of Decisions and Cooperation in Matters Relating to Maintenance
Obligations, COM (2005) 649 final (Dec. 12, 2005).
49. Commission Green Paper on Succession and Wills, COM (2005) 65 final (Mar.
1, 2005); European Parliament Resolution with Recommendations to the Commission on
Succession and Wills, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TA(2006)0496 (2006).
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Most analysts do not consider this federalization as a sign of a
revolution. Although there have been protests, especially in France
and England,50 discussion has been nowhere nearly as fierce as the
parallel debate over a European private law codification.51 Formally,
the codification overcomes the fragmentation of choice-of-law regimes
that Gerhard Kegel called the “cancer of private international law,”52
and that Savigny hoped to overcome through convergence. Proponents
of a nationalized conflict of laws in particular have advocated
unification since Mancini, albeit through treaties; European legislation
appears to fulfill this hope through legislation. Substantively, not
much appears to change. Because European choice-of-law rules are
typically bilateral and forum preference is disfavored,53 the European
legislator need not change much. Most domestic rules are therefore
substantively quite similar to the Rome Convention; the method is, at
first sight, similar to bilateralism.54
The view that federalization does not amount to a revolution is
shared in several contributions to this issue. Dennis Solomon, in his
careful analysis of the new Rome I Regulation as compared to the
previous Convention, sees a “continuation of the conventional

50. In France, some forty law professors signed an open letter to President Chirac
protesting the proposed regulation. See L’Union européenne, la démocratie et l’État de droit:
lettre ouverte au président de la République, reprinted in 2006 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE,
ÉDITION GÉNÉRALE, ACTUALITÉS NO. 586. An English translation of the letter can be found at
Comparative Law Blog, Open Letter French Private International Scholars on European
Intrusion, http://comparativelawblog.blogspot.com/2007/01/open-letter-french-private.html
(Jan. 17, 2007, 11:11 EDT). Some eighty French professors signed a letter in response,
defending the regulation against what they perceived as anti-Europeanism. See La

proposition de Règlement européen sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles (Rome
I) en question, reprinted in 2007 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE – ÉDITION GÉNÉRALE, ACTUALITÉS NO.
18. The main author of the original open letter, Vincent Heuzé, published a counter-response
rejecting the criticism of anti-Europeanism: L’honneur des professeurs de droit. Explication
d’une lettre ouverte sur l’Union européenne, la démocratie et l’État de droit, reprinted in
2007 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, ÉDITION GÉNÉRALE, ÉTUDE NO. 116. For commentary, see Erik
Jayme, Frankreich: Professorenstreit zum Europäischen IPR—einige Betrachtungen, 28
IPRAX 188-89 (2008). For the English protests, see Dickinson, supra note 43, at 199-200.
51. For an overview, see Nils Jansen, European Civil Code, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 9, at 247.
52. GERHARD KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 86 (6th ed. 1987) (author’s
translation). The sentence is no longer contained in the most recent edition of this book. See
KEGEL & SCHURIG, supra note 27, at 139.
53. KROPHOLLER, supra note 25, at 42-47.
54. Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières, La responsabilité civile dans la proposition de

règlement communautaire sur la loi applicable aux obligations non contractuelles (“Rome
II”), in LES CONFLITS DE LOIS ET LE SYSTÈME JURIDIQUE COMMUNAUTAIRE, supra note 42, at
185, 191-92.
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55

system”. By and large, as he shows, the rules under the final version
resemble both those that existed in Europe and those that exist in the
United States (with the exception that Europe provides greater
protection to weaker parties). Yet Solomon also addresses what he calls
the “revolutionary advances” proposed at earlier stages of the legislative
process that would, if enacted, have resulted in a more drastic changes:
the abolition of an escape clause, the possibility to choose nonstate law
like the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
and the mandatory application of the consumer’s home law applicable
law for consumer contracts.
Patrick Borchers, looking at European developments for contracts
from the U.S. side, is also skeptical as to whether Europe is seeing a
56
revolution.
Borchers points out how similar U.S. and European
choice-of-law rules for contracts have become in their endorsement of
party autonomy. He sees the most important difference in the concept
of mandatory rules, an important element of European choice of law,
but one hard to transplant into U.S. law, at least as can be gathered from
the very limited success of the new section 1-301 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which adopts the concept.
Jan von Hein, discussing torts, questions the notion of a European
choice-of-law revolution, arguing that the Rome II Regulation is
actually the product of a long-run evolution in member states’ domestic
57
laws.
As he notes, most EU member states have long applied
Savigny’s approach to choice of law and have codified these principles
during the twentieth century in an effort to influence EU choice of law.
The effect of these codifications is evident in the inclusion of common
domicile rules and the allowance of post-hoc party autonomy. Von
Hein concludes that Rome II is successful precisely because its rules
have been tested in member states’ courts and analyzed by European
academics prior to its promulgation.
Symeon Symeonides seconds this view in his paper, which offers
58
reciprocal lessons for the United States and Europe. Noting that early
U.S. choice of law was based on European principles, he also indicates
that current U.S. solutions to choice-of-law problems remain similar to
those of Europe, despite a purported revolution in the United States.
Generally, Symeonides recommends that the United States seek to
evolve its choice-of-law rules according to a long-run plan, rather than
55. Dennis Solomon, The Private International Law of Contracts in Europe:
Advances and Retreats, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1711 (2008).
56. Patrick Borchers, Categorical Exceptions to Party Autonomy in Private
International Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1645 (2008).
57. Jan von Hein, Something Old and Something Borrowed, but Nothing New?
Rome II and the European Choice-of-Law Evolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1663 (2008).
58. Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Revolution and the European Evolution
in Choice of Law: Reciprocal Lessons, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1741 (2008).
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rejecting them in a short-lived revolution. For Europe, Symeonides
recommends a return to issue-by-issue analysis in choice of law and an
acknowledgement of states’ interest in the outcomes of these cases.

In my opinion, the view that federalization does not change much
underestimates the decisive difference between a treaty and a
codification.59 The European Union is competent to regulate choice of
law only “in so far as necessary for the proper functioning of the
internal market.”60 Although this is often read merely to suggest the
need for uniform rules,61 this need alone would hardly justify a
regulation over a treaty. Treaties, however, leave the interests of
respective nations intact. Where national interests concur, treaties will
perpetuate protection of these interests; where national interests differ,
treaties can achieve compromises between these interests or, if no
compromise is possible, leave the issue to each national state. A
supranational codification is not confined in this way; it can also
decide against the interests of all states for the interest of individuals or
a transnational community. In this sense, its rules are neither unilateral
nor bilateral, but distributive—it allocates regulatory competence from
a central point.62 A supranational codification can establish neutral
rules. But it also can (or even must, given the limited competences of
the European Union) be based on the explicit policies of the European
Union, the requirements of the common market. As an EU instrument,
it stands in connection with the substantive policies of the European
Union and these are often opposed to those of the individual states.
Sometimes, such a connection to EU policies is explicit. One
example can be found in article 7 of Rome II (“Environmental
damage”), which effectively gives the plaintiff a choice between the
law of the place of conduct and that of the place of injury and justifies

59. Ralf Michaels, Three Paradigms of Legal Unification: National, International,
Transnational, in AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 96TH ANNUAL MEETING 333, 33336 (2002); see also Ulrich Drobnig, Unification of National Law and the Uniformisation of
the Rules of Private International Law, in THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
UPON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE MEMBER STATES 1, 2 (P. Bourel et al. eds., 1981).

60. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 65, 2006 O.J. (C 321E) 37, 68
[hereinafter EC Treaty].
61. Rome II, supra note 43, recital 6; Rome I, supra note 45, recital 6.
62. See Jürgen Basedow, Spécificité et coordination du droit international privé
communautaire, in DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ, TRAVAUX DU COMITÉ FRANÇAIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE—ANNÉES 2002-2004 at 275, 283-84 (2005). For criticism of this
point, see BERNARD AUDIT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 50 (4th ed. 2006).
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this with the goal to achieve a high level of environmental protection.63
Such preferential treatment of plaintiffs is not incompatible with
traditional choice-of-law rules.64 Nor is the integration of substantive
policy consideration in choice of law a problem (although the focus on
incentives is in contrast to the traditional European concept of tort as a
law of compensation, as found explicitly mentioned in the EU
Commission’s Rome II proposal).65 The decisive novelty is that these
interests are found neither in domestic law nor in a common consensus
but in the law of the European Union, in this case in environmental
protection and the precautionary principle as listed in article 174 of the
EU Treaty.66
Article 7 of Rome II is no outlier. Provisions on consumer
protection in Rome I are based on similar EU policy.67 The rules on
product liability in article 5 of Rome II are based not on the mere
63.
The law applicable to a noncontractual obligation arising out of environmental
damage or damage sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage
shall be the law determined pursuant to Article 4(1), unless the person seeking
compensation for damage chooses to base his or her claim on the law of the
country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred.
Rome II, supra note 43, art. 7.
64. See JAN VON HEIN, DAS GÜNSTIGKEITSPRINZIP IM INTERNATIONALEN
DELIKTSRECHT 124-26 (1999); KROPHOLLER, supra note 25, at 525-26; Christian von Bar,
Environmental Damage in Private International Law, in 268 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 291, 367-75 (1999).
65. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“ROME II”), at 12, COM (2003) 427 final (July
22, 2003) (“Article 3(1), which establishes an objective link between the damage and the
applicable law, further reflects the modern concept of the law of civil liability which is no
longer, as it was in the first half of the last century, oriented towards punishing for fault-based
conduct: nowadays, it is the compensation function that dominates, as can be seen from the
proliferation of no-fault strict liability schemes.”).
66. EC Treaty art. 174(2) (“Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high
level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the
Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that
preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified
at source and that the polluter should pay.”); Rome II, supra note 43, recital 25 (“Regarding
environmental damage, Article 174 of the Treaty, which provides that there should be a high
level of protection based on the precautionary principle and the principle that preventive
action should be taken, the principle of priority for corrective action at source and the
principle that the polluter pays, fully justifies the use of the principle of discriminating in
favour of the person sustaining the damage.”).
67. See Walter G. Paefgen, Kollisionsrechtlicher Verbraucherschutz im
Internationalen Vertragsrecht und europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 2003 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT [ZEUP] 266 (F.R.G.); Peter von Wilmowsky, Der internationale

Verbrauchervertrag im EG-Binnenmarkt—Europarechtlicher Gestaltungsspielraum für
kollisionsrechtlichen Verbraucherschutz, 1995 ZEUP 735.
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search for the closest connection, but on EU policy considerations.68
The possibility of basing a claim for unfair competition on one single
law even if several countries are affected69 helps in the establishment of
a common market, as opposed to local national markets. Actually,
every rule in the EU regulations becomes an instrument of EU policy,
even when it merely copies existing rules of domestic choice of law.
European Union choice-of-law rules become instruments of
substantive Union policies.70
This is one reason why Richard Fentiman, taking a position of an
English common lawyer and a European, views European develop71
ments in a far more dramatic light. He points out that English conflict
of laws is more different from U.S. law than one may think, but that it
also differs, traditionally, from continental European approaches. One
point for him concerns the technique of Rome I and Rome II, which he
considers “simplistic and unevolved.” Moreover, he points out that
differences over more radical proposals, as discussed by the other
authors, were not resolved in favor of a traditional approach, but rather
have been concealed. The emerging model for him is a regulatory and
social one, with an administrative view for the judge, quite unlike the
market and economic model, with an adjudicatory view for the judge as
favored by English law. Fentiman expresses fear that the European
Court of Justice will favor predictability and uniformity over flexibility
and respect for national traditions.

B.

Constitutionalization

Although federalization of choice of law is more important than
is often thought, it alone does not represent a revolution. A further
important element is the (quasi-) constitutionalization of European
choice of law.72
To speak of constitutionalization in the European context may
appear odd. Europe has no real constitution. The Constitutional Treaty
failed after unsuccessful referenda in France and the Netherlands;73 as
a response, the European Union agreed, more modestly, on a “Reform

de Vareilles-Sommières, supra note 54, at 202.
Rome II, supra note 43, art. 6(3)(b).
Basedow, supra note 62; Meeusen, supra note 1.
Fentiman, supra note 43.
Lucia Serena Rossi, L’incidenza dei principi del diritto comunitario sul diritto
internazionale privato: dalla “comunitarizzazione” alla “constitutionalizzazione,” 40 RIV. DIR.
INT. PRIV. PROC. 63 (2004).
73. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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Treaty,” the so-called Lisbon Treaty.74 Likewise, the argument that
Europe has a quasi-federalist structure faces strong opposition. But
this argument would be too formalistic. Functionally, the EC Treaty
operates as a constitution and its impact on choice-of-law rules is
structurally similar to that of other nations’ constitutions on domestic
choice-of-law rules.
Constitutionalization is the main topic in Jürgen Basedow’s
75
contribution to this issue. Though the political structure of the United
States and the European Union are different, Basedow argues that a
cautious comparison is possible since both are structured in a
76
constitutional framework. Generally, federalization assumes that the
federal body will act as a referee in conflicts arising between
jurisdictions. Basedow finds that U.S. federal law, including the U.S.
Constitution, has almost no influence on choice of law in the United
77
States. By contrast, the European Court of Justice has actively shaped
conflict of laws through its case law on the free movement of goods and
services, the freedom of establishment for corporations, and basic
rights. Basedow also summarizes the recent EU legislation in choice of
78
law. Whereas U.S. federal bodies previously have been reluctant to
intervene in state conflicts law, the European Court of Justice’s
approach could be adopted by the United States Supreme Court to
unify U.S. choice of law. Though the Supreme Court has proven
reluctant to apply balancing tests generally, a balance of collective
interests against those of a single state may be manageable.

One important aspect of constitutionalization is the quasi-federal
structure of the European Union and how this structure affects the
relationship between its member states and their laws. The other
aspect concerns nondiscrimination, EU citizenship, and human rights.
These developments overcome both the national and the private
character of classical choice of law.
1.

Mutual Recognition and the Country-of-Origin Principle

The goal of the European Community, the establishment of an
internal market, has often required interference with the application of
domestic law. To achieve this goal, the European Court of Justice has
addressed issues that resemble conflict-of-laws problems. For
74. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
75. Jürgen Basedow, Federal Choice of Law in Europe and the USA—A
Comparative Account of Interstate Conflicts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2119 (2008).
76. Id. at 2122-24.
77. Id. at 2124-28.
78. Id. at 2141-45.
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example, in its Cassis de Dijon decision of 1979, the Court held that
member states were entitled to mutual recognition of their laws
regarding standards of production,79 a principle that was later extended
to the free movement of services.80 This principle effectively asserts a
constitutional duty to recognize foreign law, especially (though not
exclusively) that of the country of origin. The approach was refined in
Keck v. Mithouard, which restricted the duty of mutual recognition to
national rules concerning product requirements and allowed the
destination state to apply its own requirements concerning selling
arrangements.81 From a conflicts perspective, this introduced both a
subtle dépeçage and a difficult characterization issue.
Nonetheless, an impact on choice of law was long ignored, no
doubt based on the perception that the European Community deals
with public laws, while choice of law is a matter of private law. Only
since the early 1990s have scholars addressed the relationship between
European Union law and choice of law with increasing intensity and
sophistication.82 At about the same time, interest grew in the
regulatory aspects and the economic analysis of choice of law.83 The
Court of Justice enriched the debate with its decisions regarding the
impact of the mutual recognition principle on the law of corporations.84
79. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein
(Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649. The Commission now plans to codify the Cassis de
Dijon jurisprudence (though explicitly only for “administrative decision,” not for private law).

See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down
Procedures Relating to the Application of Certain National Technical Rules to Products
Lawfully Marketed in Another Member State and Repealing Decision 3052/95/EC, COM
(2007) 36 final (Feb. 14, 2007).
80. Case C-76/90, Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co., 1991 E.C.R. I-4221, I-4243.
81. Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, Keck & Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097.
82. It has become impossible to give a comprehensive overview. For an extensive
bibliography, see KEGEL & SCHURIG, supra note 27, at 211-18. Jayme & Kohler provide
annual reports. See, e.g., Erik Jayme & Christian Kohler, Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2007:
Windstille im Erntefeld der Integration, 27 IPRAX 493 (2007). Notable recent collections
include LES CONFLITS DE LOIS ET LE SYSTÈME JURIDIQUE COMMUNAUTAIRE, supra note 42, and
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATE E DIRITTO COMUNITARIO (Paolo Picone ed., 2004).
83. For the scholarly discussion, see generally Horatia Muir Watt, Aspects
économiques du droit international privé, in 307 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,
RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
25 (2004); AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jürgen Basedow &
Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006); Giesela Rühl, Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An
Economic Perspective, 24 BERK. J. INT’L L. 801 (2006); Giesela Rühl, Party Autonomy in the
Private International Law of Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency,
in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 153 (Eckart Gottschalk, Ralf Michaels,
Giesela Rühl & Jan von Hein eds., 2007).
84. Case C-411/03, SEVIC Sys. AG, 2005 E.C.R. I-10,805; Case C-167/01, Kamer
van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10,155;
Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002
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Many European countries used to subject corporations to the law of
their principal place of business. The European Court of Justice has
subsequently limited the application of such a choice-of-law rule (even
though the Court did not explicitly address choice of law).
Instead of rehashing this now well-known story, authors in this Issue
take the next step and ask what follows. Onnig Dombalagian shows
how this jurisprudence moves European choice of law closer to the
internal affairs rule in the United States (which, as he reminds us, has
85
remained largely uninfluenced by the conflicts revolution). Yet he also
emphasizes the limited impact of the internal affairs rule on capital
markets regulation more generally. Current United States-European
Union trade is problematic where the two capital market regimes differ.
Specifically, the United States and the European Union differ as to
disclosure requirements, insider trading regulations, the role of
independent auditors and directors, and the appropriate conduct of
takeover transactions. However, Dombalagian notes, conflict of laws
for capital markets is characterized by extraterritoriality, bilateral
initiatives and reciprocal recognition, and issuer choice. He criticizes
these ex post approaches, however, and proposes in their stead an ex
ante choice-of-law regime to govern globally regulated stock exchanges,
providing, in particular, that these transactions be governed by the law
of the state in which security is listed on a stock exchange.
Jens Dammann focuses on the impact of the European Court of
86
Justice’s case law on in personam jurisdiction. He shows why third
parties should not, as currently allowed in both the United States and
Europe, be able to sue a corporation at its place of incorporation, even
though the law of that place governs the corporation’s internal affairs.
In suggesting two paths to reform—one on the level of member state
corporate law and the other on the level of EU rules on jurisdiction—he
shows the close interconnections between choice of law and substantive
law and between EU law and member states’ law in Europe.
Finally, Larry Catá Backer addresses choice of law in a broader
87
sense. The European Court of Justice has rendered several decisions
restricting member states’ ability to hold so-called “golden shares”—
E.C.R.. I-9919; Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Ehvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I1459. For a discussion of this case law, see Benjamin Angelette, Note, The Revolution that
Never Came and the Revolution Coming—De Lasteyrie du Salliant, Marks & Spencer,
SEVIC Systems and the Changing Corporate Law in Europe, 92 VA. L. REV. 1189 (2006).
85. Onnig H. Dombalagian, Choice of Law and Capital Markets Regulation, 82 TUL.
L. REV. 1903 (2008).
86. Jens Dammann, Adjudicative Jurisdiction and the Market for Corporate Charters,
82 TUL. L. REV. 1869 (2008).
87. Larry Catá Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authority as

Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in
Private Choice of Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1801 (2008).
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shares that give the states that hold them rights going far beyond their
nominal value. Backer suggests reading these decisions as choice-oflaw decisions that pick among various bodies of rules—private law
rules governing shareholder rights, public law rules regarding state
control over corporations, and finally rules of European law.

The influence of European Union law goes beyond the Court of
Justice and beyond corporate law. Another development concerns
legislation and the establishment of a country-of-origin principle,
under which providers need comply only with the rules of their
country of origin, as provided for in the amended TV Without Borders
Directive and the E-Commerce Directive of 2000.88 The attempt to
establish a country-of-origin principle in the Services Directive
failed;89 the final version contains a vaguer (though not automatically
less intrusive) duty to “respect the right of providers to provide
services in a Member State other than that in which they are
established.”90
There have been long debates over whether the country-of-origin
principle must be understood as a choice-of-law principle.91 The
question is not resolved simply because the E-Commerce Directive, in
article 1(4), explicitly disavows any change of rules on conflict of
laws.92 A response is possible only against the background of a
broader understanding of choice of law, which shows the paradigm
shift: the country-of-origin principle is a choice-of-law principle,
albeit not one according to classical conflict of laws but a new form of
vested-rights principle.93 Within its scope, the principle determines
88. Council Directive 89/552, On the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down
by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of
Television Broadcasting Activities, arts. 2, 2a 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23, amended by Directive
97/36, 1997 O.J. (L 202) 60; Directive 2000/31, On Certain Legal Aspects of Information
Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (“Directive on
Electronic Commerce”), art. 3, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 9-10 [hereinafter Directive on Electronic
Commerce].
89. Michaels, supra note 13, at 195-96.
90. Directive 2006/123, On Services in the Internal Market, art. 16, 2006 O.J. (L 376)
36, 58-59; see Achim Kampf, EU-Dienstleistungsrichtlinie und Kollisionsrecht, 28 IPRAX
101, 102-03 (2008).
91. For discussion of the different viewpoints and further references, see Michaels,
supra note 13.
92. Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra note 88, art. 1(4) (“This Directive does
not establish additional rules on private international law nor does it deal with the jurisdiction
of Courts.”).
93. See generally Michaels, supra note 13 (discussing the similarities between the
two approaches). For a similar discussion, see Wulf-Henning Roth, Methoden der
Rechtsfindung und Rechtsanwendung im Europäischen Kollisionsrecht, 25 IPRAX 338, 343
(2006).
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that by complying with the rules of his country of origin, a provider
acquires a privilege of which the country of destination may not
deprive him by application of its own laws.
The discussion about a country-of-origin principle is related to a
broader debate regarding the impact of a principle of mutual recognition on choice of law. Taken to the extreme, the mutual recognition
principle (like before the comparable institute of comity for Joseph
Story) would make it possible to develop an entire system of choiceof-law rules based on the Keck formula and its allocation of legislative
jurisdiction between the country of origin and the country of
destination. Traditional choice of law would be replaced entirely by a
constitutionalized system of mutual recognition. This would raise
problems not only of substance (because outcomes might change), but
especially of method.94 In traditional European conflict of laws,
recognition is reserved to foreign judgments; foreign law is not
recognized, but applied. Once the concept of recognition is extended
to foreign law, choice of law moves closer to the recognition of foreign
judgments.
The principle of mutual recognition can play an especially important
role for same-sex partnerships, the theme of Katharina Boele-Woelki’s
95
contribution. She begins by demonstrating the lack of uniformity
among EU member states in the treatment of same-sex couples: while
some member states recognize same-sex marriages, others recognize
registered partnerships or civil pacts, and others none at all. In addition,
current domestic laws do not clearly indicate whether same-sex
relationships solemnized in the couple’s home country will be
recognized abroad. Though the free movement of persons principle in
the European Convention on Human Rights could be interpreted to
require member states to recognize same-sex relationships solemnized
94. See Roberto Baratta, Problematic Elements of an Implicit Rule Providing for
Mutual Recognition of Personal and Family Status in the EC, 27 IPRAX 4, 9-11 (2006);
Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, Anerkennung im internationalen Personen-, Familien- und Erbrecht
und das Europäische Kollisionsrecht, 25 IPRAX 392, 392-400 (2006); Marc Fallon & Johan
Meeusen, Private International Law in the European Union and the Exception of Mutual
Recognition, 2002 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 37, 45-46; Paul Lagarde, Développements futurs du
droit international privé dans une Europe en voie d’unification: quelques conjectures, 68
RABELSZ 225, 235-38 (2004); Heinz-Peter Mansel, Anerkennung als Grundprinzip des
Europäischen Rechtsraums, Zur Herausbildung eines europäischen AnerkennungsKollisionsrechts: Anerkennung statt Verweisung als neues Strukturprinzip des Europäischen
internationalen Privatrechts?, 70 RABELSZ 651, 651-731 (2006). Contra Tito Ballarino &
Benedetta Ubertazzi, On Avello and Other Judgments: A New Departure in the Conflict of
Laws?, 2004 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 85, 127 (noting a parallel with Savigny).
95. Katharina Boele-Woelki, The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships
Within the European Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1949 (2008).
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in other member states, current law has not yet developed in this
direction. The European experience should teach U.S. lawmakers that
legislation on same-sex relationships must address the mobility of
persons in the United States and abroad through the inclusion of private
international law considerations in substantive regulation, with the end
goal of contributing to the universal recognition of same-sex
relationships. However, the ultimate goal must lie in substantive law
unification.
Mutual recognition is a theme also for Linda Silberman, who
compares EU and U.S. approaches to marriage, divorce, custody, and
96
support. In her view, European rules that take significant connections
into account in determining the law applicable to marriage provide a
helpful model for American attempts to distinguish “evasion” from
“mobile” marriages, especially same-sex marriages. Regarding divorce,
she finds that choice-of-law rules hardly play a role in the United States
compared to rules on jurisdiction; although the new European regime
distinguishes between these, she predicts no much greater role for
choice-of-law rules there. Silberman then discusses international
conventions on custody and support and thus addresses the global
framework within which Americans and Europeans interact and within
which comparison takes place.
Finally, Horatia Muir Watt discusses the new emphasis on
recognition, especially in the area of family law and civil status, from a
97
methodological and even philosophical perspective. The move away
from bilateral choice-of-law rules toward a unilateral system of
recognition is, for her, in accordance with recognition of identity.
However, she strongly opposes basing this method on the principle of
nondiscrimination, which for her is a “nonstarter” in choice of law.
Instead, a choice-of-law system based on recognition expresses a
respect for identity and difference: the status acquired under foreign
law must be recognized not because it is in some way similar to that of
forum law, but because its intrinsic difference is constitutive of identity.

In many ways, the tendency towards constitutionalization is
reminiscent of the United States experience in the first half of the
twentieth century.98 Once the country-of-origin principle is recognized
96. Linda J. Silberman, Rethinking Rules of Conflict of Laws in Marriage and
Divorce in the United States: What Can We Learn from Europe?, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1999
(2008)
97. Horatia Muir Watt, European Federalism and the “New Unilateralism,” 82 TUL.
L. REV. 1983 (2008).
98. For comparisons demonstrating the similar developments, see generally Pedro A.
de Miguel Asensio, Conflictos de leyes e integración jurídica: Estados Unidos y la Unión
Europea, 5 ANUARIO ESPAÑOL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 43-102 (2005); Horatia
Muir Watt, Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A Matter of Political
Economy, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383 (2003); Holger Spamann, Choice of Law in a Federal
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as a constitutionalized vested-rights theory, parallels ensue not only to
the First Restatement but also to case law by the Supreme Court in the
early twentieth century, when vested rights were protected under the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution.99 Thus, the vested-rights
theory was all but constitutionalized.
A further parallel, well known from the area of recognition of
judgments100 but widely ignored in choice of law,101 exists between the
principle of mutual recognition and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the Constitution. Shortly after its case law regarding the Due Process
Clause, the Supreme Court began to apply the Full Faith and Credit
Clause for choice of law as a duty to recognize foreign law—first as a
strict duty to apply foreign law, and later as a duty to balance the
regulatory interests of the various states.102 This duty strongly
resembles the duty of mutual recognition from Cassis de Dijon, and
the development from a duty of application to one of balancing
resembles the jurisprudential development in Europe.
Finally, the unclear distinction between a country-of-origin
principle and a principle of mutual recognition finds its parallel in a
trilogy of Supreme Court cases in the 1980s, in which the Court
combined its Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clause tests into
one uniform test.103
And yet, the same trilogy of cases stands for an important
difference between the United States and Europe. The Supreme Court
System and an Internal Market (Jean Monnet Program, Working Paper No. 8/01, 2001),
available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/012601.rtf.
99. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1930); Mut. Life Ins. Co. of
N.Y. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209, 213-14 (1922); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 37374 (1918); EDWIN SCOTT FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW FOR AMERICAN COURTS: A
MULTILATERALIST METHOD 12-14 (2001); John K. Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of
Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656, 656-57 & n.5 (1918); P.E. Herzog, Constitutional Limits on
Choice of Law, in 234 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 234, 239, 260-66 (1992); G.W.C.
Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?, 15 MINN. L. REV.
161, 165 (1931).
100. E.g., Georg Haibach, The Mutual Recognition of Decisions in Civil and

Commercial Matters in the European Union in the Light of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, 10 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 291, 291-300 (2003).
101. But see Horatia Muir Watt, Experiences from Europe: Legal Diversity and the
Internal Market, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 429, 438 (2004).
102. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 547-50
(1935); Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indust. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 500-05 (1939);
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159-62 (1932), overruled in part by Crider
v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965).
103. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730-34 (1988); Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-19 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320
(1981) (plurality opinion).
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reduced constitutional control of state approaches to choice of law to
an absolute minimum (with a possible exception for the law of
corporations, which also has an exceptional role before the European
Court of Justice).104 A recent decision states, “Without a rudder to steer
us, we decline to embark on the constitutional course of balancing
coordinate States’ competing sovereign interests to resolve conflicts of
laws under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”105 The European Court of
Justice, by contrast, seems either to need no rudder or is willing to
build it on its own. This is true even outside commercial law, as recent
developments in the law of family names suggest. This is an area of
the law that may appear marginal to Americans, but in fact it
epitomizes the cultural identities underlying the most pertinent
European conflicts case. In Garcia Avello, the Court decided that
children with dual Belgian and Spanish citizenship are entitled to bear
their last name according to Spanish law, even though the choice-oflaw rules of Belgium, where the children resided, designated Belgian
law as the law applicable to Belgian citizens who are dual citizens of
another country.106 In Grunkin-Paul, the question was whether a child
born in Denmark to two German parents was entitled to have his name
registered in Germany as a double name combining both parents’
names according to Danish law, even though the German law
applicable under German choice-of-law rules rejects a double name
under these circumstances.107 A referral by the German registry to the
European Court of Justice was rejected for formal reasons;108 a new
referral on essentially the same question has not yet been decided,109
but the opinions by the Advocate General in both cases, which would
permit double-name registration in Germany despite German law, may
104. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93 (1987); Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644-46 (1982). More explicit (for obvious reasons) is case law
from the Delaware Supreme Court. See, e.g., VantagePoint Venture Partners 196 v. Examen,
Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1115-18 (Del. 2005); McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 214-16
(Del. 1987). See generally Deborah A. DeMott Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate
Internal Affairs, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 183-90 (1985).
105. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003).
106. Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello v. État Belge, 2003 E.C.R. I-11,613. For a
summary and analysis of the case, see Johan Verlinden, European Court of Justice, Judgment
of October 2, 2003, Case C-148/02, Carlos Garcia Avello v. État Belge (the State of
Belgium), 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 705 (2005).
107. Case C-96/04, Standesamt Stadt Niebüll (Grunkin-Paul), 2006 E.C.R. I-3561.
The affair even made the news in the United States. See Mary Jacoby, No Hyphens, Please:
Germany Tells Parents To Keep Names Simple, WALL ST. J., Oct 12, 2005, at A1.
108. Grunkin Paul, 2006 E.C.R. para. 20.
109. See Case C-353/06, Grunkin v. Grunkin-Paul (Apr. 24, 2008) (opinion of AG
Sharpston), available at http://curia.europa.eu.
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give some guidance for how the Court will decide.110 It becomes clear
how the basic freedoms impact classical conflict of laws even beyond
traditionally market-relevant areas of the law.
2.

Nondiscrimination, EU Citizenship, and Human Rights

Two important provisions in both these cases are the principle of
nondiscrimination and the new institution of EU citizenship.111 This
alone does not sound revolutionary: equal treatment is one of the
oldest principles of conflict of laws, and citizenship is a traditional
connecting factor. Comparison with the United States, however,
demonstrates the importance.
In the United States, the principle of equal protection, established
in the Fourteenth Amendment,112 has had fairly limited impact on
choice of law. Domicile is one of the most important connecting
factors; states’ preference for their own residents over the residents of
other states is a cornerstone of interest analysis. In Europe, similar
arguments exist.113 Early on, scholars discussed whether use of
nationality as a connecting factor was barred by EU law.114 Yet
although the Court has applied the nondiscrimination principle in
several civil procedure cases,115 it has not yet gone so far as to bar
nationality as a connecting factor in choice of law.116 In fact, neither in
Garcia Avello nor in Grunkin-Paul does the tension between
nationality and habitual residence play any role. In both cases, the
children successfully avoided application of the law of both their
nationality and their habitual residence. In Grunkin-Paul, the relevant
connecting factor for the Advocate General was the child’s Danish
110. Grunkin Paul, 2006 E.C.R. I-3561 (opinion of AG Jacobs); Case C-353/06,
Grunkin (opinion of AG Sharpston), available at http://curia.europa.eu.
111. EC Treaty arts. 12, 17-18.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
113. VON BAR & MANKOWSKI, supra note 25, § 3 no. 41.
114. SAVATIER, supra note 34; Ulrich Drobnig, Verstößt das Staatsangehörigkeitsprinzip gegen das Diskriminierungsverbot des EWG-Vertrages?, 34 RABELSZ 636, 63662 (1970). For further references, see KROPHOLLER, supra note 25, at 277.
115. See, e.g., Case C-323/95, Hayes v. Kronenberger GmbH, 1997 E.C.R. I-1711, I1724; Case C-122/96, Saldanha v. Hiross Holding AG, 1997 E.C.R. I-5325, I-5342; Case C43/95, Data Delecta Aktiebolag v. MSL Dynamics Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-4661, I-4676; Case C398/92, Mund v. Hatrex Int’l Transport, 1994 E.C.R. I-467, I-481 to 82; Case C-20/92,
Hubbard v. Hamburger, 1993 E.C.R. I-3777, I-3793 to 94; Case 22/80, Boussac Saint-Frères
SA v. Gerstenmeier, 1980 E.C.R. 3427, 3436.
116. See Case C-430/97, Johannes v. Johannes, E.C.R. I-3475; Michael Bogdan, The

EC Treaty and the Use of Nationality and Habitual Residence as Connecting Factors in
International Family Law, in INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 303,
308-15 (Johan Meeusen et al. eds., 2007).
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birth certificate.117 And in Garcia Avello, the Court invoked the
children’s Spanish nationality over their Belgian residence and
nationality: “It is not permissible for a Member State to restrict the
effects of the grant of the nationality of another Member State by
imposing an additional condition for recognition of that nationality
with a view to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms provided for
in the Treaty.”118 It follows that the question of whether nationality as a
connecting factor accords with EU law or whether it must be replaced
by habitual residence is not broad enough. Garcia Avello can perhaps
be implemented by granting dual nationals free choice of the
applicable law;119 whether the result in Grunkin Paul can sensibly be
translated into classical choice of law appears doubtful. The decisions
can be understood only from a principle of mutual recognition.
Something else is relevant. The basis for the nondiscrimination
principle is neither nationality nor habitual residence, but EU
citizenship.120 The children are protected not as individuals or as
nationals of a member state but as EU citizens. This results in another
obvious parallel with the United States, where the Fourteenth
Amendment commands that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States.”121 Yet the Privileges and Immunities Clause has never
played a great role for choice of law, occasional scholarly suggestions
notwithstanding.122 In Europe, things look different: EU citizenship
superimposes in an important way the traditional importance of the
nation.
Finally, a third new factor in European choice of law is
fundamental rights. Fundamental (or human) rights are sometimes
viewed as the basis of classical conflict of laws;123 that they can
117. Case C-96/04, Standesamt Stadt Niebüll (Grunkin Paul), 2006 E.C.R. I-3561
(opinion of AG Jacobs); Case C-353/06, Grunkin v. Grunkin-Paul (opinion of AG Sharpston),
paras. 67-70, available at http://curia.europa.eu.
118. Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello v. État Belge, 2003 E.C.R. I-11,613, I-11,645 to
46.
119. Mansel, supra note 94, at 692, 694-96.
120. EC Treaty art. 18. For an overview, see Flora Goudappel & Silvia Romein,
Evolving Legal Personality: The Case of European Union Citizenship, 11 IUS GENTIUM 1
(2005); Jo Shaw, E.U. Citizenship and Political Rights in an Evolving European Union, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 2549 (2007).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
122. See BRAINERD CURRIE, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:
Privileges and Immunities, in CURRIE, supra note 10, at 445, 445-525; Douglas Laycock,

Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of
Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 274-88 (1992).
123. See sources cited in Michaels, supra note 20, at 131-33.
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influence choice of law, especially within the public policy exception,
is not new, either.124 However, when the Advocate General based his
opinion in Grunkin-Paul in part on the right to private and family life
in article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which,
according to the European Court of Human Rights, includes the right
to one’s name,125 this suggests a considerable expansion of their
importance, with far-reaching consequences,126 up to the possibility
that choice of law itself becomes an instrument for human rights.127

C.

Pluralization of Method

If these developments lead to a paradigm shift, as is claimed here,
the new paradigm still needs to be formulated.128 However, two
important developments can be discovered. One replaces the
international focus of choice of law, the other one the role of the
closest connection.
1.

Internal and External Conflicts

Classical European conflict of laws is international in focus and
makes no difference between different countries. Prima facie, this is
true also for European choice of law: Rome I and Rome II
Regulations also apply vis-à-vis third countries—despite doubts about
European Union competence for relations with third countries.
Although conflicts scholars hope to maintain this international focus as
much as possible,129 it was predicted early on that the similar treatment
of all countries’ laws could not be maintained.130 This is now proving
true. Europeanization of choice of law distinguishes importantly
between intra-Community conflicts and conflicts with third countries.

124. KROPHOLLER, supra note 25, at 249-50.
125. Case C-96/04, Standesamt Stadt Niebüll (Grunkin-Paul), 2006 E.C.R. I-3561
(opinion of AG Jacobs) (citing Stjerna Case App. No. A280-B, 37 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R.
278 (1994); Burghartz Case, App. No. A299-B, 37 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 166 (1994)).
126. Meeusen, supra note 1, at 296-97.
127. Veerle van den Eeckhout, Promoting Human Rights within the Union: The Role
of European Private International Law, 14 EUR. L.J. 105, 105-06 (2008).
128. For first attempts, see Stefan Grundmann, Internal Market Conflict of Laws:
From Traditional Conflict of Laws to an Integrated Two Level Order, in LES CONFLITS DE LOIS
ET LE SYSTÈME JURIDIQUE COMMUNAUTAIRE, supra note 42, at 5; KATRIN SCHILLING,
BINNENMARKTKOLLISIONSRECHT (2006).
129. E.g., Karl Kreuzer, Zu Stand und Perspektiven des Europäischen Internationalen
Privatrechts—Wie europäisch soll das Europäische Internationale Privatrecht sein?, 70
RABELSZ 1, 78-86 (2006).
130. E.g., IAN F. FLETCHER, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 44
(1982).
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As between member states, European private law becomes even
more “bilateral” than before, because the principle of mutual
recognition widely bars preference of the forum, as becomes clear
from Garcia Avello. This rules out submitting dual nationals not only
to the law of the forum if it presents one of the nationalities but also to
the “effective” nationality, which was not allowed a role in Garcia
Avello.131 Party autonomy is no longer merely a tool to determine the
applicable law but an instrument toward a competition among legal
orders; choice of the applicable law is not only (perhaps) a right,132 but
also an obligation to avoid losing protection from the basic freedoms.133
Renvoi may be largely excluded between member states.134 Domestic
public policy is restricted between member states;135 the importance of
a European public policy has grown.136 The application of mandatory
rules by third countries is bound by EU law.137 The duty to determine
the content of foreign law and apply it properly is greater toward
member states than toward third countries; the same is true for
appealability of questions of foreign law.138 Circumvention of the
131. See Mansel, supra note 94, at 692.
132. For further references, see SCHILLING, supra note 128, at 176-77, 260-64.
133. Case C-339/89, Alsthom Atlantique v. Sulzer, 1991 E.C.R. I-107, para. 15.
134. Kreuzer, supra note 129, at 84; cf. KROPHOLLER, supra note 25, at 178-79
(discussing renvoi in the context of treaties).
135. Ralf Michaels & Hans-Georg Kamann, Europäisches Verbraucherschutzrecht und
IPR, 52 JURISTEN ZEITUNG [JZ] 601, 607 (1997) (F.R.G.); Luigi Fumagalli, EC Private

International Law and the Public Policy Exception—Modern Features of a Traditional
Concept, 2004 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 171, 178-79; see Marc Fallon, Les conflits de lois et de
juridictions dans un espace économique intégré—L’expérience de la Communauté
Européenne, in 253 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 252-53 (1996).
136. See Jürgen Basedow, Recherches sur la formation de l’ordre public européen
dans la jurisprudence, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ : ESPRIT ET MÉTHODES. MÉLANGES
EN L’HONNEUR DE PAUL LAGARDE 55 (2005) [hereinafter MÉLANGES LAGARDE]; Hans van
Houtte, From a National to a European Public Policy, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE
WORLD, supra note 6, at 841, 847-48, 852-53; Savatier, supra note 34, at 252; For a
comprehensive analysis, see generally IOANNA THOMA, DIE EUROPÄISIERUNG UND DIE
VERGEMEINSCHAFTUNG DES NATIONALEN ORDRE PUBLIC (2007).
137. Hans-Jürgen Sonnenberger, Zweites Kapitel, Internationales Privatrecht:
Einleitung, in 10 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH: INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 5, no. 216, at 131-33 (4th ed. 2006).
138. Andreas Schwartze, Die Ermittlung und Anwendung des Vertragsrechts anderer
EU-Staaten im deutschen Zivilprozeß nach § 293 ZPO—ein besonderer Fall, in RECHT IN
EUROPA: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HILMAR FENGE 127, 144 (Pelaya Yessiou-Faltsi et al. eds., 1996);
Oliver Remien, Iura novit curia und die Ermittlung fremden Rechts im europäischen

Rechtsraum der Art. 61ff. EGV—für ein neues Vorabentscheidungsverfahren bei
mitgliedstaatlichen Gerichten, in AUFBRUCH NACH EUROPA, 75 JAHRE MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT
FÜR PRIVATRECHT

617, 625, 630 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2001); Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg,

Foreign Law in National Courts—A Comparative Perspective, 304 ACADÉMIE
INTERNATIONAL,

RECUEIL
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ordinarily applicable law is encouraged by the deliberately formal
factors of the principles of mutual recognition and country-of-origin,
as the Centros decision by the Court of Justice made clear.139
Of these developments, the most important one for Erin O’Hara and
140
Larry Ribstein is the rising role of party autonomy. Their interest in
developing a market for law leads them to develop five requirements
for efficient choice-of-law regimes. Applying this framework to the
centralized top-down choice-of-law regime in Europe and the
decentralized bottom-up regime in the United States, they find that both
systems can learn from each other: Americans can learn about
constitutionalized and centralized choice of law, especially from
European Court of Justice jurisprudence. Europeans can learn how the
decentralized state of choice of law in the United States may actually
favor a market for laws.

In relation to third countries, by contrast (where the European
Union adopts the former role of its member states through its
membership in the Hague Conference), the trend goes toward
unilateral preference for European law. Thus, favoring of member
state citizenship is not only still allowed: EU citizenship will likely
restrict even more the scope of the law of third countries for dual
nationals. Public policy and European mandatory rules have become
more important, too. A striking example can be found in the European
Court of Justice’s Ingmar decision of 2000.141 The Court had to decide
whether a commercial agent operating within the European Union was
protected by certain provisions of the 1985 European directive on
commercial agents, even though the agent was working for a
Californian principal and had signed a contract stipulating that
California law governed their relationship.142 Given that the directive
was largely modeled on German and French law, it would have
followed to adopt decisions by these countries’ highest courts and to
characterize such protection as not immune against party choice of

INTERNATIONAL LAW 181, 368 (2003); Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Die Auslegung und
Fortbildung ausländischen Rechts, 116 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS 3, 48 (2003).
139. FRANÇOIS VIANGALLI, LA THÉORIE DES CONFLITS DE LOIS ET LE DROIT
COMMUNAUTAIRE 116-17 (2004); Klaus Schurig, Unilateralistische Tendenzen im
europäischen Gesellschaftskollisionsrecht, oder: Umgehung als Rechtsprinzip, in LIBER
AMICORUM GERHARD KEGEL 199 (Hilmar Krüger et al. eds., 2002).
140. Erin Ann O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Rules and Institutions in Developing a
Law Market: Views from the United States and Europe, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2147 (2008).
141. Case C-381/98, Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Techs., Inc., 2000 E.C.R. I9305.
142. Id. at I-9332.

1638

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1607

law.143 However, the European Court of Justice did not hesitate to
enforce the directive over the parties’ choice of law144 and thus gave
greater weight to the regulatory interests of the European Union than
classical choice of law did for states’ regulatory interests. The Court’s
justification was that this protection was necessary to achieve equal
market conditions in the European marketplace,145 thereby
demonstrating the difference with internal conflicts: If member states
use this argument to justify application of their own law over that of
the country of origin, it regularly fails. The use of regulatory interests
to determine the territorial scope and mandatory character of EU
choice of law resembles, in its method and in its results, the Supreme
Court jurisprudence regarding the scope and binding force of federal
statutory law. This suggests, at least in relations with third countries,
an Americanization of European choice of law.146
2.

From Method of Conflicts to Conflict of Methods

In the United States, the demise of the vested-rights theory led to
two kinds of new methods. One set of proposals suggested a new
uniform focus, for example on governmental interests, which made
them better adapted for some problems than others. Other methods
collected a number of relevant factors with unclear relations among
themselves.
147

This is the focus of Bill Reppy’s article for this issue.
Reppy
distinguishes three theories of choice of law: territorialism, personal
law, and interest analysis. These methods can be combined in various
ways, and Reppy tries to show how harmful such combinations can be.
He distinguishes between three kinds of eclecticism. The first is
second-look eclecticism, where courts apply primarily one method but
will apply another method if the first method is inconclusive. A second
type is dépeçage eclecticism, where different parts of one area of the
law are resolved by different methods. The third, and for Reppy the
143. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Jan 30, 1961, 14 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1061 (F.R.G.); Cour de cassation [Cass com.] [highest
court of ordinary jurisdiction], Nov. 28, 2000, Bull. civ. IV No. 183 (Fr.) (basing its decision
on the prevalent view in France; the decision came down two weeks after the Ingmar
decision).
144. See Ingmar, 2000 E.C.R. at I-9335.
145. See id. at I-9334 to 35.
146. Ralf Michaels & Hans-Georg Kamann, Grundlagen eines allgemeinen

gemeinschaftlichen Richtlinienkollisionsrechts—“Amerikanisierung” des GemeinschaftsIPR?, 12 EUROPÄISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERRECHT 301, 311 (2001).
147. William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Methods for Resolving Tort and Contract
Conflict of Laws: The United States and the European Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2053 (2008).
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most despised, is big-mix eclecticism, where courts are unable to say
both what goes into the mix and how the methods relate to each other.
Finding examples of these three kinds of combinations in both
European and American choice of law, Reppy provides a critique of
both regimes.

In Europe, it looks as though a new choice of law is emerging as
the combination of two methods. The first of these methods largely
resembles classical choice of law, moderated, however, in the way
discussed through federalization. This method is supplemented by a
second method grounded in EU law. That second method looks
neither to balances between regulatory interests of states, nor to the
closest connection.148 Instead, it regulates the conflict between states’
regulatory interest on the one hand, and private rights on the other
hand, as protected (indirectly) through the four freedoms.
Two recent decisions by the European Court of Justice may
illustrate this combination. In the Viking case, Finnish employees had
attempted to prevent the reflagging of a shipping company from
Finland to Estonia.149 The Laval case raised the question of whether
Swedish unions could take collective action to enforce a Swedish
collective agreement against a Latvian company posting Latvian
workers to building sites in Sweden.150 From a classical choice-of-law
perspective, the relations between employer and employees would
likely be governed by Swedish or Finnish law respectively, because
article 8(1) of Rome I determines that the protective provisions of the
law of the country in which the employee habitually carries out his
work in performance of the contract remain applicable. If, in the Laval
case, the employees are only temporarily employed in Sweden, then
Latvian law applies to them pursuant to article 8(2). With regard to the
unions, the law applicable to injuries from industrial action under
article 9 of Rome II (which was inapplicable to these cases), would be
“the law of the country where the action is to be, or has been, taken”;
this is true also for preliminary injunctions.151 For the Court of Justice,
however, such choice-of-law rules played no role. Instead, the Court
addressed the conflict as one between the unions exercising their social

148. Mansel, supra note 94, at 724.
149. Case C-438/05, Int’l Transport Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, 2007 ECJ
(Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://curia.europa.eu.
150. Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet,
2007 ECJ (Dec. 18, 2007), available at http://curia.europa.eu.
151. Rome II, supra note 43, arts. 9, 15(d).
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rights under state law on the one hand, and the respective corporation
exercising its right to free movement on the other.152
The coexistence of two fundamentally different choice-of-law
methods has three important implications. First, the EU method
deviates deliberately from the closest connection, so a conflict of
methods is often unavoidable.153 For example, the country of origin is
not the law of the marketplace (which will often have the closest
connection);154 its law is applied precisely in order to break open the
monopolistic position of the law of the market, if that law’s application
stifles competition. The Centros decision, requiring Denmark to apply
English law to a company that was Danish in almost all respects except
that it was registered in England, illustrates a similar point. The
decision was not based on the idea that connections to England were
closer than to Denmark, but rather on the desire to enable parties to
escape the restrictions of the law of the closest connection. Because
the traditional method and the new European law have conflicting
goals, it will hardly be sufficient merely to translate the EU method
into new connecting factors under the traditional paradigm.155
A second important consequence ensues. The conflict within the
EU method between private rights and state regulation can be decided
entirely by EU law, in particular the provisions and case law on the
four freedoms and the goals of the European Union, without a need to
resort to traditional choice of law. This is obvious in the Laval and
Viking decisions, which were decided in one case for the employees,
in the other for the employer.
This means, thirdly, that the method of conflicts in Europe has
now turned into a conflict of methods. It is no longer sufficient to
resolve conflicts of law on the basis of one method that is, in and by
itself, more or less coherent. Often, the traditional method would yield
a result different from that ensuing from application of EU
constitutional law. The decision to be made is then which method
trumps the other, with regard to the specific case before the judge. In
152. For a discussion of the cases, see Norbert Reich, Free Movement v. Social Rights
in an Enlarged Union: The Laval and Viking Cases Before the European Court of Justice, 9
GERMAN L.J. 125 (2008).
153. Michaels, supra note 13, at 238. But see Marc Fallon, Le principe de proximité
dans le droit de l’Union européenne, in MÉLANGES LAGARDE, supra note 136, at 241, 246.
154. Dieter Martiny, Die Anknüpfung an den Markt, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ULRICH
DROBNIG ZUM SIEBZIGSTEN GEBURTSTAG 389 (Jürgen Basedow et al. ed., 1998).
155. Cf. Jürgen Basedow, European Private International Law of Obligations and
Internal Market Legislation—A Matter of Coordination, in LIBER MEMORIALIS ŠARČEVIĆ,
supra note 42, at 13, 21-24.
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the United States, it is clear that the Constitution merely sets outer
limits and does not specify a choice-of-law method the states must
follow. The same was true in Europe for a long time. Now that choice
of law itself has become an EU instrument, this conflict of methods
occurs within Community law. It seems likely that the conflict will
frequently be resolved to the detriment of classical choice of law.
One example is the Rüffert case recently decided by European
Court of Justice.156 The question in this case was whether German
procurement law could require a Polish bidder to commit to paying
wages according to German law to its Polish employees.157 Under
article 8(2) of Rome I, the employment contract would be governed by
Polish law if the employees were only temporarily employed in
Germany; mandatory rules of German law might also be applicable
under article 9. Though the Advocate General began his analysis with
these provisions (more exactly, the parallel provisions of the Rome
Convention), he ended up using them merely to trigger a discussion of
specific EU provisions and considerations, in particular the Posting of
Workers Directive.158 Article 9 of Rome I turns from an exception and
opening clause into a mere entry gate for EU law.159 Whether the Court
of Justice will give more weight to traditional choice of law when the
Rome I Regulation becomes applicable to such cases appears doubtful.
IV. EUROPEANIZATION AS REVOLUTION
These developments constitute a genuine revolution.
Europeanized choice of law can hardly be accommodated with the
three pillars of classical choice of law developed in the nineteenth
century. It represents a paradigm shift that is at least as fundamental as
was the U.S. conflicts revolution. European choice of law is no longer
private, national, and domestic/international. It is now European,
regulatory, and mediatized.

A. A Genuine Revolution
First, Europeanization replaces the privatized choice of law in the
sense of Savigny with a regulatory choice-of-law regime. Privatization
156. Case C-346/06, Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, 2008 ECJ (Apr. 3, 2008),

available at http://curia.europa.eu.
157. See id. para. 17.
158. See Directive 96/71, Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of the
Provision of Services, 1997 O.J. (L 18) 1.
159. See Rüffert, 2008 ECJ (opinion of AG Bot), paras. 10-12, available at http://curia.
europa.eu.
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does not refer to the exclusion of public interests but to the specific
private law resolution of conflicts through reference on the basis of the
closest connection; this approach now steps to the background. This
becomes clear in the principles of mutual recognition and country-oforigin, which use recognition instead of reference, use formal criteria
instead of the criterion of the closest connection, and draw European
choice of law close to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. The horizontal relation between two parties is supplanted
by the vertical relation between actors in the internal market on one
hand and regulating states on the other. Even more importantly, the
rules in the federalized choice-of-law regime of the Rome Regulations
can no longer be understood as referring rules in the sense of Savigny.
They are now distributive rules—European rules which redistribute
legislative competence among the member states from a central
position and on the basis of EU policies.
The national character of choice of law is replaced by a truly
European choice-of-law regime. For Mancini, choice of law found its
political foundation in the individual’s membership in the nation; this
was the ground for the nationality principle.160 If this nationality
principle now loses its fundamental role for choice of law not to the
(unpolitical) habitual residence but to supranational EU citizenship,
membership in the European Union has implications far beyond
determination of the law applicable to personal status. The legal
positions accruing to the individual via her EU citizenship—EU basic
rights, fundamental freedoms, nondiscrimination—are not emanations
of her link to a nation state (as were, for example, the fundamental
rights of domestic constitutions). Instead they limit these links: the
individual can appeal to the European Union against the rules of her
own state.161
Finally, the domestic internationalism of choice of law is replaced
by a mediatized choice of law.162 This is immediately apparent from its
foundation, which is no longer national but supranational: choice of
law is now European law. Moreover, the focus of choice of law is now
European as well. Internally, conflicts of laws are resolved with a view
to a uniform area of justice; externally, they serve essentially to protect
and delimit the European Union. If choice of law before was bilateral,
160. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
161. See Christian Joerges, The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private
Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 149, 178-79 (2004).
162. For a critique, see Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon, Quel droit international privé pour
l’Union Européenne?, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 9, at 317, 329-38.
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now its external side is (at least partly) unilateral; its internal side is
regulatory.
In theory it is possible that these developments will in the long
run merge into the classical paradigm. This would require that the
federalized choice-of-law regime remain oriented toward the closest
connection, that the mutual recognition and country-of-origin
principles be translated into classical referring choice-of-law rules, that
the European Union in the long run replace the nation, and that
European choice of law again become more bilateral. This is not likely
to happen. It would presuppose that the European Union will not
utilize the regulatory competence it has acquired, and there is little
reason to think that.

B.

Comparison with the United States

This European revolution is at least as significant as the U.S.
revolution. As in the United States, the outcomes of many conflicts
cases may be the same. But the way in which Europeans think about
choice of law will change fundamentally.
In one way, the European revolution is even more radical than the
American one. In the United States, the step away from the formalism
of vested rights toward a choice-of-law approach that takes seriously
the relevant regulatory interest was entwined with the idea that the
coordination of these interests should occur on the federal level—
through federal legislation,163 the federal courts,164 or a greater role for
the Constitution. None of these steps occurred: the Congress lacks
incentives to enact legislation,165 and the Supreme Court essentially
barred the federal courts from developing a meaningful choice-of-law
regime166 and restricted the influence of the Constitution to a minimum
in the trilogy of cases in the 1980s discussed earlier.167 In this
important sense, the American conflicts revolution has remained
incomplete.

163. See supra note 36-38 and accompanying text.
164. E.g., William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV.
1, 23 (1963); Elliott E. Cheatham, A Federal Nation and Conflict of Laws, 22 ROCKY MT. L.
REV. 109, 111 (1950); Harold W. Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law Choice of Law,
14 UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1193 (1967); Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The
Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (1945); Laycock, supra note
122, at 333.
165. Laycock, supra note 122, at 334.
166. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-98 (1941).
167. See cases cited supra note 103.
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It goes without saying that the European developments cannot
simply be transplanted to the United States. Just as the American
conflicts revolution was, so is the new European choice-of-law
revolution ultimately contingent upon its own framework. In the
United States, federal legislation is generally suspect and unlikely to
succeed in choice of law; the current emphasis on states rights
probably makes federalization and constitutionalization impossible.
Whether a model code would be more promising168 appears doubtful.
But even short of a direct transplant, the European developments
should be of interest to the United States. Revolutionaries learn from
one another, even if they aim for different goals. If the comparison of
U.S. and EU choice of law, long confined to the influence of United
States on European choice of law, can become a true dialogue again,169
the European conflicts revolution will have at least one undeniably
positive consequence.

168. Larry Kramer, On the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code, 89 MICH. L. REV.
2134, 2134-49 (1991).
169. Cf. Reimann, supra note 9, at 113; Jan Kropholler & Jan von Hein, From
Approach to Rule-Orientation in American Tort Conflicts?, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A
MULTISTATE WORLD, supra note 6, at 317, 339.

